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I.  INTRODUCTION 
When a marriage dissolves there are tax consequences for everything from 
distribution of property to custody of the couple’s children.  An already emotionally 
devastating time can easily become financially devastating as well.  The current tax 
system for alimony and child support strengthens the possibility of financial 
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devastation.  Under the present system, alimony and child support have opposite tax 
treatment.  Alimony is included in the recipient’s gross income1 and deductible by 
the payor,2 while child support is neither deductible nor includable.3  The separate tax 
treatment for alimony and child support unnecessarily complicates the tax 
consequences of divorce and leads to traps for the unwary.  It is also inconsistent 
with traditional income-shifting theory, where the payee, rather than the payor, 
should be taxed on the payment since both control and enjoyment are lodged in the 
payee.  Thus, change is needed. 
Changes in the tax treatment of divorce have been made several times over the 
past century, beginning in 1917 when the Supreme Court ruled that alimony should 
not be included in the recipient’s gross income.4  Further change occurred in 1942, 
when the precursors to the current Sections 71 and 215 of the Internal Revenue Code 
were enacted.5  Under the current system, section 71 requires that payments of 
alimony be included in the gross income of the recipient.6  Section 215 provides for a 
corresponding deduction to the payor for the alimony paid during his or her taxable 
year.7  However, there are no parallel provisions for child support, so it remains 
taxable to the payor and tax-free to the recipient.  Indeed, Internal Revenue Code 
Section 71(c) specifically provides that payments made for the support of children of 
the payor spouse are ineligible for the inclusion/deduction pattern.8  Thus, these 
provisions reveal that the issue here is who should be taxed on income earned by one 
former spouse but paid to the other spouse to spend as he or she wishes.  The basic 
structure of inclusion/deduction for alimony and no inclusion/no deduction for child 
support has remained unchanged to the present day.9  However, many complicated 
rules have been added to distinguish between alimony and child support, which will 
be discussed later in this paper. 
Multiple cases have been litigated in an attempt to clarify the intricate provisions 
of the applicable code sections.10  It is nearly impossible for the average taxpayer to 
                                                                
1I.R.C. § 71(a) (1999-2000). All citations to the Internal Revenue Code are to this code 
(which is technically the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended) unless otherwise 
specified. 
2See I.R.C. § 215(a) (2000). 
3See id. §§ 71(c), 215. 
4Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151 (1917). 
5Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Tax Aspects of Divorce and Separation, 32 FAM. L.Q. 221, 222 
(1998) (citing S. Rep. No. 77-1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942), reprinted in 1942-2 C.B. 
504; see also H.R. Rep. No. 77-2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942), reprinted in 1942-2 C.B. 
372)).  
6I.R.C. § 71(a). 
7See id. § 215(a). 
8See id. § 71(c). 
9See id. §§ 71, 215. 
10See e.g., Marten v. Commissioner, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 584 (1999); Simpson v. 
Commissioner, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 191 (1999); Lawton v. Commissioner, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 
153 (1999); Preston v. Commissioner, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 1437 (1999); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-510, 
1992 C.B. 33 (discussed infra note 97). 
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understand the system with all of its confusing provisions.  This leads to traps for the 
unwary and unexpected consequences from divorce settlements.11  It is easy for more 
sophisticated taxpayers to manipulate the system to disguise one type of payment as 
the other for more desirable tax treatment.12  Furthermore, these complexities are not 
necessary to maintain a functioning system of divorce taxation. 
The taxation of child support and alimony has also been popular in law review 
articles and other scholarly journals.13  Solutions such as tax credits for ex-spouses 
who meet their support obligations14 and private ordering of payments by the ex-
spouses15 have been proposed.  However, none have been implemented, and none are 
sufficient to solve the problems of the current system.  There must be a 
simplification of the present law so that the average divorced taxpayer will be able to 
understand and implement the rules with or without sophisticated tax counsel or an 
amicable relationship with his or her ex-spouse.   
This goal can be achieved by treating alimony and child support the same for tax 
purposes.  This leaves only two possible situations.  The first is that both alimony 
and child support should be taxed to the payor (through the denial of a deduction) 
and not included in the recipient’s gross income.  The opposite conclusion is that 
both alimony and child support should be deductible by the payor and taxed to the 
recipient by including the payments in her gross income.  This paper will argue that 
the best solution is for both alimony and child support to be taxed to the recipient.  
This will be accomplished by providing a deduction to the payor and including both 
payments in the recipient’s gross income.16 
There are several benefits from treating both types of support in a like manner.  It 
will provide the simplicity that is needed for both the average taxpayer and the 
                                                                
11Roland L. Hjorth, Divorce, Taxes, and the 1984 Tax Reform Act: An Inadequate 
Response to an Old Problem, 61 WASH. L. REV. 151, 173 (1986). 
12Marci Kelly, Calling a Spade a Club:  The Failure of Matrimonial Tax Reform, 44 TAX 
LAW. 787 (1991).   
13See e.g., Hjorth, supra note 11; Wendy Gerzog Shaller, On Public Policy Grounds, A 
Limited Tax Credit for Child Support and  Alimony, 11 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 321 (1994); Beverly 
I. Moran, Welcome to the Fun House: The Incredible Maze of Modern Divorce Taxation, 26 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 117 (1989).  
14Shaller, supra note 13, at 337.  This author proposes a limited tax credit for child support 
and alimony payments.  The credit would be computed at the 15 percent rate on the sum of 
alimony and child support up to $15,000.  Thus, the maximum credit under this approach 
would be $2250.  The goal of this reform is to allow “all taxpayers [to] . . . benefit at the same 
rate regardless of their particular tax brackets.”  See Shaller, supra note 13, at 338. 
15Kelly, supra note 12, at 811-12.  The article’s author advocates using private ordering as 
the method of determining the tax consequences of divorce payments.  Under her approach, 
the parties themselves would determine the tax consequences of payments on a contractual 
basis.  In the current system, alimony may selectively be designated as nonalimony.  This 
system would allow the reverse as well.  Nonalimony could be designated as alimony. 
16For simplicity, this paper will assume that the payor spouse is the husband and the 
recipient is the wife.  Obviously, in reality there are often recipients who are male and payors 
who are female. 
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courts.17  Thus, the complicated provisions distinguishing between alimony and child 
support will be unnecessary, and the amount of court time spent on the topic will 
decrease.  It will also eliminate the need for taxpayer manipulation since it treats 
both types of payment the same.18  From a tax policy standpoint, the person who will 
control and enjoy the money, who in this case is the recipient, will be taxed.  
Furthermore, the presence of a tax deduction could function as an incentive for ex-
spouses to pay their alimony and child support obligations.19  Finally, such treatment 
reduces the overall tax burden and leaves more after-tax money for support. 
This viewpoint has its critics as well. However, this paper will show that many of 
the reasons advocated by those who disfavor this type of tax treatment are outdated 
and unpersuasive.  For example, the argument that taxing the recipient is unfair 
because it intensifies the economic hardship of women after divorce is based upon 
empirical evidence that has recently been disproved.20  Moreover, the after-tax 
amount can always be held constant, whether the payment is tax neutral or results in 
inclusion for the payee and deduction for the payor.  Indeed, as I will show, the 
inclusion/deduction system can actually increase the after-tax payment received by 
most payees over what they would receive in a tax neutral system.21  Finally, the 
argument that such a system creates preferential treatment for divorced couples over 
non-divorced couples is incorrect.22  In fact, the economic unit of “husband and 
wife” is taxed consistently before and after divorce.23 
Although no system of taxation is without flaws, taxing both alimony and child 
support to the recipient will create the best possible method of divorce taxation.  It 
will achieve the much–needed goals of simplicity, fairness and support of children 
that are needed from the tax system as it relates to divorce.  This paper will advocate 
this method of taxation by first examining the history of the tax effects of divorce, 
then stating the problems with the current system, and finally discussing in depth the 
benefits and consequences of taxing the recipient on both alimony and child support.  
                                                                
17See Deborah H. Schenk, Simplification for Individual Taxpayers:  Problems and 
Proposals, 45 TAX L. REV. 121, 164 (1989). 
18See Kelly, supra note 12, at 808. 
19See Shaller, supra note 13, at 341. 
20See Sanford L. Braver, The Gender Gap in Standard of Living After Divorce: Vanishing 
Small?, 33 FAM L.Q. 111, 115-16 (1999). 
21See infra Part IV. 7 for a discussion of this concept. 
22See Lisa Ann Coe, Comment, Changing Child Support Taxation in Canada: Great Step 
or Sidestep?, 19 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 969, 983 (1997); see also Schenk, supra note 
17, at 164. 
23See Schenk, supra note 17, at 164. 
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II.  HISTORY OF THE TAX TREATMENT OF ALIMONY AND CHILD SUPPORT 
A.  Pre-1942 and Gould v. Gould 
The roots of the controversy of divorce taxation can be traced back to the 1917 
Supreme Court decision, Gould v. Gould.24  This case was one of the first to examine 
how income should be defined for purposes of the income tax.25  The issue before the 
Court was whether an ex-wife’s alimony payments received from her ex-husband 
should be taxed to her.26  The Court held that alimony payments were not income to 
the recipient, and thus were not taxable to the recipient.27  The taxation of alimony 
was treated as nondeductible and excludable following this decision.  This treatment 
matched the attitude of early 20th century America that divorce should be an 
uncommon event and when it does occur, husbands owe a constant duty of support.28  
Therefore, under this view, husbands should also bear the tax burden of their 
obligation.29  Since there was no income inclusion by the wife during marriage and 
the duty of support continues after divorce, the Court determined that she should not 
have an income inclusion for support payments after divorce.30 
In an effort to escape the tax treatment of Gould, ex-husbands developed other 
methods of fulfilling their obligations of alimony.31  One such device was the 
alimony trust.32  Husbands relied on the principle that income from property is taxed 
to that property’s owner.33  Thus, if an ex-husband placed stock in trust, with his ex-
wife as beneficiary, the dividends would be taxed to her, as owner of the trust 
                                                                
24Gould, 245 U.S. 151 (1917).  Interestingly, Mr. Gould sought the advice of the 
Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service on how to treat alimony for tax purposes.  The 
Commissioner believed that income should be income to the recipient, but also that it should 
not be deducted by the payor.  Thus, Mr. Gould withheld taxes from his wife’s monthly 
payments.  It was this withholding of funds that prompted Mrs. Gould to sue Mr. Gould for 
alimony arrears.  See supra note 13, at 119-20.  
25See Moran, supra note 13, at 119.  This article proposes that the current divorce tax laws 
should be amended to return to the Gould approach.  The author believes the most equitable 
approach would be to place the entire tax burden on the payor, by denial of a deduction. 
26Gould, 245 U.S. at 152. 
27Id. at 154. 
28Deborah E. Behr, Tax Planning in Divorce: Both Spouses Benefit from the Tax Reform 
Act of 1984, 21 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 767, 772 (1985). 
29See Kelly, supra note 12, at 789. 
30See Moran, supra note 13, at 120-21. 
31See Moran, supra note 13, at 121. 
32See Moran, supra note 13. 
33Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 113 (1930).  This decision dealt with husband and wife 
taxpayers who lived in a community property state.  Thus, all property owned by either party 
was considered joint property.  The Court ruled that income from property is to be taxed to the 
owner of the property, which in this case was the marital unit.  Thus, the Court held that all 
income earned by the husband was property attributable to the marital community. 
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property.34  The alimony trust allowed men to meet their alimony obligation while 
escaping payment of the tax on alimony that Gould required.35  The Supreme Court 
caught on to this scheme and eliminated this option by ruling that husbands should 
be taxed on income generated from a trust that is used to pay alimony.36  Therefore, 
the outcome in Gould was retained, and the case remained controlling precedent for 
the next 25 years.37 
B.  The Enactment of Sections 71 and 215 
As the number of divorces in America increased, society’s attitude regarding 
divorce and alimony changed.38  It was seen as unfair to require an ex-husband to be 
taxed on income used for alimony from which he received no direct benefit.39  
Taxing ex-husbands on income enjoyed by their ex-wives was now seen as unduly 
burdensome.40  Congress reacted to the change in times and increase in divorce by 
enacting the statutory precursors of §§ 71 and 215 in 1942.41  These sections made 
alimony payments deductible to the payor and includable in the recipient’s gross 
income.42  Such a shift in the tax burden on alimony reflected the view that the prior 
system was unfair to the ex-husband.43 
The new tax treatment brought about constitutional challenges in the courts.44  
There was concern on the part of ex-wives, who now bore the tax burden of alimony, 
that such payments were not actually income.45  If alimony payments are not income, 
                                                                
34See Moran, supra note 13, at 121 n.17.  
35Moran, supra note 13, at 121. 
36Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U.S. 1 (1935).  In this case an ex-husband created a trust, with 
proceeds going to his ex-wife, to fulfill his alimony obligation.  He argued that the income 
should be taxed to his ex-wife, the beneficiary of the trust.  However, the court reasoned that 
creating a trust to pay alimony is no different than receiving the income personally and 
making the payment directly.  Since the latter scenario, under Gould, requires the husband to 
pay the tax on the payment, so should the former situation.  Therefore, the husband had to pay 
taxes on the income from the trust. 
37See Moran, supra note 13, at 122. 
38See Behr, supra note 28, at 772. 
39Behr, supra note 28, at 772.  Congressman Disney stated that “[t]he amount of [a] 
husband’s income which goes . . . as alimony . . . is in reality no income to him at all since he 
has no control over it . . . .” Behr, supra note 28, at 772 (citing 88 CONG. REC. 6377 (1942)). 
40See Moran, supra note 13, at 122-26.  The impetus for these changing attitudes was 
World War II.  The main goal of the Revenue Act of 1942 was to increase taxes to raise 
money for the war effort.  Many Congressmen thought it unfair to require ex-husbands to pay 
the high war-time taxes on income enjoyed by their ex-wives. 
41Revenue Act of 1942 § 421 (codified as amended at I.R.C. §71).  
42Id. 
43See Moran, supra note 13, at 125. 
44See, e.g., Mahana v. United States, 88 F. Supp. 285 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied 339 U.S. 978, 
reh’g denied, 340 U.S. 847 (1950). 
45Id. at 288. 
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they reasoned, then such payments are not taxable under the 16th Amendment.46  The 
issue was finally resolved in 1950 when it was held that alimony payments are 
income that Congress may tax under the Constitution.47  Thus, alimony remained 
deductible by the ex-husband and included in the gross income of the ex-wife.  
The law made under the 1942 act was retained when the Internal Revenue Code 
was enacted in 1954, with a few amendments.48  Under the 1954 Code, § 71 made 
alimony payments gross income for the recipient, and § 215 provided a deduction to 
the payor.49  Child support, however, was still governed by Gould and was not 
deductible or includable.50  In fact, § 71(b) specifically removed child support from 
the inclusion/deduction scheme.51  This basic structure remains in the current, 
Internal Revenue Code of 1986.52 
However, from the enactment of these provisions in 1942 to 1984, several 
problems developed in implementing these laws.53  For example, since alimony was 
the only type of support payment that was deductible, it had to be determined 
whether a certain type of payment should properly be classified as alimony, as 
opposed to child support or a property settlement.  There were four basic 
requirements for a payment to be considered alimony.54  First, the payment had to be 
                                                                
46Id; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XVI (stating, “The Congress shall have power to lay 
and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among 
the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration”). 
47Mahana, 88 F. Supp. at 288.  An ex-wife brought suit to recover taxes she had paid on 
alimony received from her ex-husband.  She argued that the legislation allowing alimony to be 
treated as income to the recipient was unconstitutional.  She said alimony is not income, so the 
Sixteenth Amendment does not authorize its taxation.  The court disagreed and said that 
“income” should take its plain meaning, and in this case money received by a woman from her  
ex-husband should be income to her; see also Shomaker v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 192, 198-
200 (1962); Cooper v. Commissioner, 21 T.C.M. (CCH) 1190, 1190 (1962) (holding that 
taxing alimony to the recipient also does not violate the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments). 
48I.R.C. §§ 71, 215 (1954) (current version at I.R.C. §§ 71, 215). 
49Id. at § 71 (a)(1), which provides: “If a wife is divorced or legally separated from her 
husband under a decree of divorce or of separate maintenance, the wife's gross income 
includes periodic payments (whether or not made at regular intervals) received after such 
decree in discharge of (or attributable to property transferred, in trust or otherwise, in 
discharge of) a legal obligation which, because of the marital or family relationship, is 
imposed on or incurred by the husband under the decree or under a written instrument incident 
to such divorce or separation.”  Section 215 allows a deduction to the payor for payments 
meeting the requirements of § 71.  
50Id. at § 71(b). This section provided that: “Subsection (a) shall not apply to that part of 
any payment which the terms of the decree, instrument, or agreement fix, in terms of an 
amount of money or a part of the payment, as a sum which is payable for the support of minor 
children of the husband.  For purposes of the preceding sentence, if any payment is less than 
the amount specified in the decree, instrument, or agreement, then so much of such payment as 
does not exceed the sum payable for support shall be considered a payment for such support.” 
51Id. 
52I.R.C. §§ 71, 215. 
53See Behr, supra note 28, at 772-73. 
54See Behr, supra note 28, at 773. 
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periodic.55  This meant the payment had to be for an uncertain amount, continue for 
an indefinite time, or continue for longer than ten years from the date of decree or 
agreement.56  Second, the payment had to be made because of the marital or family 
relationship, meaning the payment was one of support.57  Next, the payment was 
required to be made pursuant to the decree or under a written instrument relating to 
the divorce.58  Finally, the payment had to be made in discharge of a legal 
obligation.59  If, and only if, these requirements were met could the payor spouse 
deduct payments.  The complexity of these rules led to confusion and dissatisfaction 
among taxpayers.60  Furthermore, even if a divorcing couple labeled a payment as 
alimony, the courts would not always honor their agreement.61 
Similar confusion arose regarding child support payments.62  The code required 
child support payments to be “fixed” as child support by the decree, instrument or 
agreement.63  Thus, a slight variation in drafting divorce agreements could cause 
nontaxable child support to be treated as alimony.64  Therefore, much litigation 
ensued to interpret the rules and distinguish between alimony and child support.65 
An important decision came down from the Supreme Court in 1961, which 
further regulated the classification of child support payments.66  In Commissioner v. 
Lester, the Supreme Court held that a divorce agreement reducing the amount 
payable on a contingent relating to the child (such as death or marriage) did not “fix 
with requisite clarity” the amount for child support.67  Thus, the payments were 
                                                                
55I.R.C. § 71(a)(1) (1954) (current version at I.R.C. § 71(b) (1999-2000)). 
56See Behr, supra note 28, at 773. 
57I.R.C. § 71(a)(1) (1954) (current version at I.R.C. § 71(b) (1999-2000)). 
58Id. 
59Id. 
60See Behr, supra note 28, at 773. 
61Casey v. Commissioner, 12 T.C.M (CCH) 224, 227 (1949). Petitioner labeled his 
alimony payments as ‘periodic’ in the divorce decree in order to qualify for an alimony 
deduction.  However, the court ruled that the payments were installment payments, not 
‘periodic,’ and Casey was not entitled to a deduction.  In a key passage the court stated, 
characterization of payments is “a determination to be made by this Court.”  
62See Behr, supra note 28, at 773-74. 
63I.R.C. § 71(b) (1954) (current version at I.R.C. § 71(c) (1999-2000)). 
64See Behr, supra note 28, at 773.  
65See Behr, supra note 28, at 773. 
66Commissioner v. Lester, 366 U.S. 299 (1961). 
67Lester, 366 U.S. at 299.  The taxpayer and his wife made a written agreement pursuant to 
divorce which stated that payments made would be reduced by one-sixth if any of their three 
children married, became emancipated, or died.  The court ruled that this agreement did not 
‘specifically designate’ these payments as child support.  In order to be considered child 
support, payments must be so ‘specifically designated’ and not left to inference by the court.  
Therefore, all of the payments under the agreement were treated as alimony and were 
deductible from the taxpayer’s gross income. 
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treated as alimony and were deductible by the payor and taxed to the recipient.  This 
rule—that child support payments had to be expressly designated as child support in 
the decree or agreement to qualify as child support—is known as the Lester Rule.68  
After Lester, courts refused to infer from the facts of a specific case that payments 
were child support.69  The only way to be absolutely certain payments would be 
considered child support by the courts was to specifically label them as such in the 
divorce instrument. 
The specific rules for determining the nature of a support payment caused much 
litigation.70  Taxpayers could never be certain of the tax consequences of divorce 
payments, which made divorce negotiation difficult.  The rules were confusing, 
difficult to apply and often served as traps for unwary taxpayers.71  After over 40 
years of such confusion, Congress finally took action. 
C.  The Tax Reform Act of 1984 and The Current System 
Congress attempted to simplify the rules governing the tax consequences of 
divorce in the Tax Reform Act of 1984.72  The goals of the reform were: (1) 
encouraging ex-spouses to engage in tax planning together, and (2) restricting 
taxpayers from going too far in making their own decisions.73  The changes were 
consistent with divorce law reform which shifted from a fault-based to a no-fault-
based divorce system.74  Gone were the attitudes from the Gould era that divorce 
should never occur and husbands owe a continuing duty of support.  Instead, a more 
cooperative divorce was envisioned.  However, many commentators do not believe 
the reform has truly accomplished these goals.75  One legal scholar called the reform 
“a travesty imposed on the general public and on lawyers in general practice by 
specialists.”76  
                                                                
68See John Y. Taggart, Economic Consequences of Emotional Choices:  Divorce and 
Separation Under TRA 84, 15 CUMB. L. REV. 341, 355 (1985).  
69See Taggart, supra note 68, at 355. 
70See Behr, supra note 28, at 773. 
71See Behr, supra note 28, at 773. 
72Tax Reform Act of 1984 § 422, Division A of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 
(codified as amended at I.R.C. § 71 and hereinafter referred to by citation to current Internal 
Revenue Code). 
73See Moran, supra note 13, at 148. 
74See Moran, supra note 13, at 147.  In 1971, the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act was 
amended to eliminate the fault grounds for divorce.  In 1972, California became the first state 
to recognize irreconcilable differences as legitimate grounds for divorce. By 1984, all states 
had some form of no-fault divorce available.  See Moran, supra note 13, at 147. 
75See e.g., Hjorth, supra note 11; Moran, supra note 13; Taggart, supra note 68 
(advocating that the 1984 reform did not achieve its goals and the tax system is still in need of 
improvement). 
76Hjorth, supra note 11, at 187.  This article recommends that all cash payments made 
pursuant to divorce should be income to the recipient if they meet the requirements of § 71(b).  
However, the author states that the payor should only be able to deduct these payments if he 
can show that they are in the nature of support payments.  Hjorth, supra note 11, at 155.  The 
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2000
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The details of the reform are beyond the scope of this paper; however, some of 
the basic changes are necessary to mention at this point.  Section 215 was not 
substantively changed and still provides a deduction for payments that qualify as 
alimony under § 71.77  Some of the previous requirements under § 71 did not change.  
For example, payments must still be made under a divorce or separation instrument 
to be deductible.78  However, the definition of § 71 alimony underwent some major 
changes.79  First, the requirement that to be considered alimony, payments must be in 
cash was added.80  Also, the payor and payee may not be members of the same 
household at the time payments are made.81  Another change in the revised 
provisions is that the requirement that payments be for support in order to classify as 
alimony was eliminated.82  However, several provisions were added so the basic 
element of support was retained.83  For example, payments must terminate at the 
death of the recipient, and the instrument must specifically state this, unless 
payments terminate by state law.84 
Under the 1984 system, the periodic requirement was also eliminated.85  Thus, all 
cash payments otherwise satisfying the criteria above are alimony unless the couple 
designates that the payments are not alimony.86  This change gives ex-spouses more 
freedom to choose how their payments will be taxed, though parties cannot “opt 
into” the alimony inclusion/deduction system without satisfying all of the 
requirements specified in the § 71 definition of alimony.87 
Another important change was made regarding child support.  Under previous 
law (the Lester Rule), payments were not treated as child support unless they were 
                                                          
author also advocates reinstatement of the Lester Rule to permit parties to determine which 
parties should pay the income on child support.  Hjorth, supra note 11, at 189. 
77See Taggart, supra note 68, at 347. 
78See Taggart, supra note 68, at 347. 
79I.R.C. § 71(b), which provides: “The term ‘alimony or separate maintenance payment’ 
means any payment in cash if- (A) such payment is received by (or on behalf of) a spouse 
under a divorce or separation instrument, (B) the divorce or separation instrument does not 
designate such payment as a payment which is not includible in gross income under this 
section and not allowable as a deduction under section 215, (C) in the case of an individual 
legally separated from his spouse under a decree of divorce or of separate maintenance, the 
payee spouse and the payor spouse are not members of the same household at the time such 
payment is made, and (D) there is no liability to make any such payment for any period  after 
the death of the payee spouse and there is no liability to make any payment (in cash or 
property) as a substitute for such payments after the death of the payee spouse.” 
80I.R.C. § 71(b)(1). 
81I.R.C. § 71(b)(1)(C). 
82See Hjorth, supra note 11, at 154. 
83See Hjorth, supra note 11, at 154. 
84I.R.C. § 71(b)(1)(D). 
85See Taggart, supra note 68, at 350. 
86See Moran, supra note 13, at 148. 
87I.R.C. § 71(b)(1)(B). 
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specifically designated as such.88  The 1984 revision repealed the Lester Rule.89  
Under the present system, child support payments cannot be deducted, even if not 
specifically designated as child support.90  Child support payments are identified as 
payments that terminate or decrease upon the occurrence of a contingency relating to 
a child.91  For example, if the divorce instrument provides that the payments will be 
reduced by $100 per month when a child reaches the age of 18, then $100 of each 
monthly payment will be treated as fixed for child support.92 
These changes, among others, were meant to simplify the system and make the 
tax rules easier to apply.  Unfortunately, while the reform did solve some of the 
intended problems, there is still much confusion regarding divorce taxation.  
Furthermore, the 1984 Act brought new problems to the surface, such as the repeal 
of the Lester Rule93 that further complicate the system. 
III.  PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT SYSTEM 
Although several attempts at reform have been made, the current tax treatment of 
child support and alimony remains insufficient.  There are four main problems that 
plague the current system.  First, notwithstanding the 1984 effort to simplify the 
system, it is too complex for the average, unrepresented participant in divorce.94  
Next, it is easy for a more sophisticated taxpayer to manipulate the system and 
disguise one type of payment as another type.95  Third, this complicated system leads 
to traps for the unwary taxpayer.96  Finally, under the assignment-of-income 
doctrine, the person who has control of the money should bear the tax burden on that 
item of income.  The current system is inconsistent with this doctrine because child 
support is taxed to the payor spouse, who has no control of the payments made.  
Each of these problems contributes to the need to change the current taxation of 
alimony and child support. 
                                                                
88I.R.C. § 71(b) (1954) (current version at I.R.C. § 71(c)); see also Lester, 366 U.S. at 299. 
89See Hjorth, supra note 11, at 155; Tax Reform Act of 1984 § 422 
90I.R.C. § 71(c)(1), which provides: “Subsection (a) shall not apply to that part of any 
payment which the terms of the divorce or separation instrument fix (in terms of an amount of 
money or a part of the payment) as a sum which is payable for the support of children of the 
payor spouse.”   
91I.R.C. § 71(c)(2).  Examples of contingencies relating to the child are attaining a 
specified age, marrying, dying, and leaving school.  
92JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS 
OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984 715 (1984). 
93See Taggart, supra note 68, at 356. 
94See Moran, supra note 13, at 165. 
95See Kelly, supra note 12, at 803. 
96See Hjorth, supra note 11, at 187. 
11Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2000
372 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:361 
A.  Complexity 
Since the Tax Reform Act of 1984, there has continued to be much litigation 
involving the payment of child support and alimony.97  This litigation is due in large 
part to the complexity of the system and the inability of the typical taxpayer to 
understand it.98  According to one scholar, “[c]omplexity in some areas may be 
justified because the underlying transactions themselves are complex and the 
transactions are likely to be supervised by experts.  That is not [the case with] 
divorce.”99  Divorce is an occasion that often involves unsophisticated taxpayers, so 
it is necessary to simplify the system.100  Furthermore, attorneys in general practice, 
not typically tax specialists, represent divorcing clients.101  The current system is 
difficult for general practice lawyers to apply intelligently, which leads to the clients’ 
failure to understand the laws and general distrust in the equity of the system.102   
The main cause of the confusion is the separate tax treatment of alimony and 
child support.103  This disparate treatment forces the taxpayer to attempt to determine 
whether a payment is alimony or child support, which involves interpretation of 
complex rules.104  Because spouses often disagree as to the proper tax treatment of a 
payment or simply do not understand the laws, it leads to litigation.  Such litigation 
bogs down the courts and costs taxpayers additional money in an already financially 
difficult time.  However, “the need for administrative or judicial determination 
continues as long as substantive inquiry is necessary.”105 
B.  Taxpayer Manipulation 
Since there are different tax consequences for child support and alimony, there is 
also an incentive for taxpayers to manipulate the system.106  A somewhat 
sophisticated taxpayer could disguise child support or a property settlement as 
                                                                
97See e.g., Marten v. Commissioner, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 584 (1999); Simpson v. 
Commissioner, 78 T.C.M (CCH) 191 (1999); Lawton v. Commissioner, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 153 
(1999); Preston v. Commissioner, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 1437 (1999); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-510, 1992 
C.B. 33.  All of these cases deal with whether payments should be classified as alimony or 
child support.  The cases had mixed results with some labeling the payments as alimony 
(deductible to the payor/includible to the recipient) and others labeled the payments as child 
support (nondeductible/not includible).  These cases and Private Letter Rulings are just a few 
of the many examples of court and Internal Revenue Service time that has been devoted to 
distinguishing between alimony and child support for the purposes of taxation.  
98See Moran, supra note 13, at 165. 
99See Hjorth, supra note 11, at 187. 
100See Moran, supra note 13, at 165. 
101See Hjorth, supra note 11, at 187. 
102See Hjorth, supra note 11, at 187. 
103See Moran, supra note 13, at 165. 
104See Moran, supra note 13, at 165. 
105Kelly, supra note 12, at 803. 
106Kelly, supra note 12, at 802-03.  
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alimony to get the corresponding deduction.107  These attempts to circumvent the 
system will lead to even more litigation.108  The incentive to manipulate the system 
will persist as long as there remain different tax consequences for alimony and child 
support.109   
C.  Traps for the Unwary 
Another problem resulting from the opposite treatment of alimony and child 
support is that it creates traps for the unsophisticated taxpayer.110  Where some 
taxpayers will attempt to disguise payments, other less sophisticated taxpayers who 
have no intention of disguising a payment will be trapped into mistreating one 
payment as another.111  If payments do not meet the specific requirements of § 71, 
they do not qualify as alimony.  For example, temporary support paid pursuant to a 
decree that does not specifically state payments terminate upon the death of the 
payee are not deductible as alimony unless the payments would stop by operation of 
a state statute.112  Thus, taxpayers must be careful that their payments meet all of the 
stated requirements, or they could inadvertently mislabel one type of support as the 
other.   
In another example, suppose there is a divorcing couple with two children.113  
The husband is ordered to pay the wife $800 per month for three years (at which 
point one child will be 18 years, 3 months old).114  Under the current system, there is 
an assumption that this money is child support because it occurs within six months of 
a child’s eighteenth birthday.115  However, the payor might be able to rebut the 
presumption and deduct the payments.116  The payee, on the other hand, would 
assume the payments are child support and exclude them from her gross income.117  
Therefore, inadvertently, one party is deducting payments that the other party does 
                                                                
107See Taggart, supra note 68, at 356; See also Hjorth, supra note 11, at 187.  The author 
describes a situation where the divorcing couple could attempt to “whipsaw” the 
Commissioner.  The payee could fail to report periodic payments, claiming that they were 
somehow contingent to an event relating to the child.  The payor, on the other hand, would 
deduct the same payments claiming they met the objective tests of I.R.C. Section 71 and were 
not child support.  If the Commissioner did not detect such treatment, the couple could 
completely avoid taxation on the item of income.  Since she did not report the payments, the 
amount did not go into her gross income, and she did not pay taxes on it.  He took a deduction 
on the same payments, which means he escaped taxation as well. 
108See Taggart, supra note 68, at 356. 
109See Kelly, supra note 12, at 802-03. 
110See Hjorth, supra note 11, at 187. 
111See Hjorth, supra note 11, at 173. 
112See Hjorth, supra note 11, at 173. 
113See Hjorth, supra note 11, at 173. 
114See Hjorth, supra note 11, at 173. 
115I.R.C. § 71(c)(2)(A), (B). 
116See Hjorth, supra note 11, at 173. 
117See Hjorth, supra note 11, at 173. 
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not report.118  The present system encourages such inconsistent reporting.  The only 
way to determine which party is correct is to litigate.119  Such traps are likely to 
persist as long as the current tax system is retained and child support and alimony are 
taxed to different spouses. 
D.  Inconsistent with Assignment- of- Income Doctrine 
The current tax structure for alimony and child support creates another problem 
in that it is inconsistent with the underlying theory in income-shifting contexts where 
control usually dictates who is taxed on a payment.  A common variable used by 
courts, outside of the alimony and child support context, when deciding who should 
be taxed, as between payor and payee, is dominion or control over the money.120   
The assignment- of- income doctrine is a common law doctrine that has 
developed over many decades.121  It has been used to determine which of several 
possible taxpayers should pay the tax on a particular item of income.122  Beginning in 
1930, the Supreme Court ruled on several non-alimony or child support cases 
concerning who the proper taxpayer is for an item of income.123  The principles 
developed in these cases can be used to allocate the tax burden for  child support and 
alimony payments as well. 
The assignment-of-income doctrine began with Lucas v. Earl, in 1930.124  This 
case involved an attempt by a husband to shift some of his income to his wife for tax 
purposes.125  The Court declared control as the essential element in deciding the 
proper taxpayer for an item of income.126  Therefore, it refused to allow the husband 
to shift his income, since he retained ultimate control over the funds.127 
                                                                
118See Hjorth, supra note 11, at 173. 
119See Hjorth, supra note 11, at 173. 
120See, e.g., Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930); Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 
(1940). 
121See Michael Asimow, The Assault on Tax-Free Divorce: Carryover Basis and 
Assignment of Income, 44 TAX L. REV. 65, 84 (1988). 
122See Asimow, supra note 121, at 84. 
123See, e.g., Lucas, 281 U.S. at 111; Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940).   
124Lucas, 281 U.S. at 111.  The respondent, Earl, made a contract with his wife in an 
attempt to share all of his income with her as joint property.  Such sharing of property would 
also share the tax burden, which would consequently lower the tax burden attributable to the 
income.  The issue was whether Earl could be taxed for the whole of his income, or should be 
taxed for only half in view of the contract with his wife.  The Court disallowed his attempt at 
shifting a portion of the tax burden, requiring that whoever earned the income should be taxed 
on it. 
125Id. 
126See Ayla A. Lari, Sharing Alike: French Family Taxation as a Model for Reform, 37 
DUQ. L. REV. 207, 247 (1999) (interpreting Lucas v. Earl, 291 U.S. 111 (1930)). 
127Lucas, 281 U.S. at 114; but see Poe v. Seaburn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930) (where it held that 
in community property states, income and property are attributed to the marital unit, and each 
spouse is deemed the owner of one half of the marital income and property and is taxed 
accordingly). 
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The assignment-of-income doctrine continued to develop with cases that dealt 
with intrafamily gifts and trusts.128  In Blair v. Commissioner,129 a father assigned 
income from a trust to his children.  The Court attributed the tax on this income to 
the children because the father successfully transferred his complete interest.130  This 
can be contrasted with situations in which the income-earner attempts to decrease his 
tax burden while surrendering little or no control over the income by keeping it in the 
family.131  The Court refused to allow these latter attempts at escaping taxation when 
the income-earner retained control over the income.132  Helvering v. Clifford dealt 
with a grantor of a trust assigning the income of the trust to his wife.133  In a key 
passage, the Court indicated the importance of control as determining the proper 
individual to pay taxes on an item of income:  
Since the income remains in the family and since the husband retains 
control over the investment, he has rather complete assurance that the trust 
will not effect any substantial change in his economic position.  It is hard 
to imagine that respondent felt himself the poorer after this trust had been 
executed, for as a result of the terms of the trust and the intimacy of the 
familial relationship respondent retained the substance of full enjoyment 
of all the rights which previously he had in the property.134  
                                                                
128See Asimow, supra note 121, at 84. 
129300 U.S. 5 (1937). 
130Id. at 13-14.  The specific facts of the case are as follows: A beneficiary of a trust 
assigned the income of the trust to his children.  The issue was whether the assignor was still 
taxable on the income.  The Government argued that the assignments were only “a right to 
receive the income” and “no attempt was made to assign any equitable right, title, or interest in 
the trust itself.”  The Court disagreed.  It ruled that the petitioner was the owner of an 
equitable interest in the property.  He assigned this complete interest and the assignees thereby 
became the owners of the beneficial interests.  Therefore, these assignees, and not  the 
petitioner, should be taxed on the income. 
131See, e.g., Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940); Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 
(1940). 
132See Horst, 311 U.S. at 118.  That case involved a taxpayer who owned a coupon bond.  
He retained ownership of the bond but transferred the interest coupons shortly before their due 
date to his son.  The Court held that the father should be taxed on the interest collected by the 
son.  It considered the interest coupons a gift, which would be tax free to the recipient.  The 
Court stated, “the power to dispose of income is the equivalent of ownership of it.  The 
exercise of that power to procure the payment of income to another is the enjoyment and 
hence the realization of the income by him who exercises it.”  See Horst, 311 U.S. at 118. 
133309 U.S. at 331. 
134Clifford, 309 U.S. at 335-36.  In that case, the husband declared himself trustee over 
certain securities.  He distributed income from this trust to his wife, at his “absolute 
discretion.”  The issue was whether the husband, as grantor of the trust, may still be treated as 
owner of the corpus, and thus subject to taxation on the income generated from it.  The Court 
held that the benefits directly or indirectly retained by the grantor of the trust left him with 
enough dominion and control over the corpus to be taxed on income generated by it.  Another 
key passage from that decision is: “So far as his dominion and control were concerned it 
seems clear that the trust did not effect any substantial change.  In substance his control over 
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Thus, the court ruled that the husband was responsible for paying the income tax 
on the trust income.135 
Therefore, as the history of the assignment- of-income doctrine shows, control is 
a major factor in deciding who to tax on a particular item of income.  In fact, the 
control principle serves as a check to preserve the integrity of the taxation system.136  
The present treatment of alimony is consistent with this theory.  Since the ex-wife 
receives money that she has complete control over, she must pay the taxes on it.  
However, by requiring the payor to bear the tax burden for child support, the current 
taxation of child support is inconsistent with the assignment- of- income doctrine.  A 
non-custodial father should not be required to pay taxes on money over which he 
retains no control. 
Despite all of the reforms made to the tax treatment of alimony and child support, 
the current system is inadequate.  It does not satisfy the goals of simplicity or 
administrative feasibility.  Furthermore, it traps the unwary taxpayer and allows a 
more sophisticated taxpayer to manipulate the system.  Its placement of the tax 
burden on the payor of child support is inconsistent with the assignment-of-income 
doctrine and its underlying value that whoever controls the payments should pay the 
corresponding tax.  Thus, it is necessary to change the current system and tax child 
support and alimony in a like manner. 
IV.  PROPOSAL:  BOTH ALIMONY AND CHILD SUPPORT SHOULD BE TAXED  
TO THE RECIPIENT 
If child support and alimony are to be taxed in the same manner, there are only 
two possible approaches.  The first approach is to tax both forms of payment to the 
payor.137  This would mean the payor does not get a deduction, and the recipient does 
not include the payments in her gross income.  The alternative approach is to tax 
both alimony and child support to the recipient.  Under this approach, the payee 
would include the payments in gross income, and the payor would get to deduct the 
payments.  In sum, both forms of payment can be taxed to the payor, or both can be 
taxed to the recipient.  The resulting system must be administratively feasible, 
straightforward and consistent with assignment-of-income tax policy.138  For the 
reasons set forth below, the best way to reform the system is to require the recipient 
to pay taxes on both forms of payment and to provide a corresponding deduction to 
the payor.  
                                                          
the corpus was in all essential respects the same after the trust was created, as before.  The 
wide powers which he retained included for all practical purposes most of the control which 
he as an individual would have.”  Id. at 335. 
135Id. at 336. 
136See Lari, supra note 126, at 247. 
137This is the approach advocated by Moran, supra note 13. 
138See Moran, supra note 13, at 166. 
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A.  Arguments in Support of Proposal 
1.  Simplification 
A very obvious benefit of taxing both alimony and child support to the recipient 
is that it simplifies the system.139  It is the distinction between alimony and child 
support that is responsible for the complexity infiltrating the current taxation of 
divorce.140  This opposite treatment necessitates the complex rules currently in force 
and requires extensive court interpretation.141  Treating alimony and child support the 
same for tax purposes eliminates this complexity.142  Because the tax burden is 
assigned solely to one person, there is no longer the need to distinguish between 
payments.143  The complex definitional rules of  section 71 can be completely 
discarded.  This simplification of the system will benefit three main groups: 
taxpayers, attorneys and the courts. 
The proposed, straightforward approach will be more easily comprehended by 
the average taxpayer.144  Most divorcing couples are not sophisticated in matters of 
tax and finance.145  Many divorcing couples are represented by general practice 
attorneys, who are also not experts in tax and finance.146  Some taxpayers are not 
represented by attorneys at all during divorce.  Such a system, of taxing both 
alimony and child support to the recipient, would allow the typical taxpayer to 
understand the tax consequences of his or her divorce and better negotiate 
settlements.147  It will reduce the need for divorcing couples to seek sophisticated tax 
counsel to sort through the complicated tax consequences of divorce.148  It will also 
produce fewer problems for those taxpayers who were not able to afford 
sophisticated tax counsel in the first place. 
Taxing alimony and child support to the same person would also affect the 
attorneys who represent divorcing clients.149  Many divorcing taxpayers are 
represented by general practice attorneys, not tax specialists.150  The complex rules of 
the present system make it difficult for such attorneys to effectively advise their 
                                                                
139See Schenk, supra note 17, at 162. 
140See Moran, supra note 13, at 165. 
141See Moran, supra note 13, at 166. 
142See Moran, supra note 13, at 166. 
143See Moran, supra note 24, at 166. 
144See Moran, supra note 24, at 166. 
145See Hjorth, supra note 11, at 175. 
146See Hjorth, supra note 11, at 175. 
147See Moran, supra note 24, at 118. 
148See Hjorth, supra note 11, at 175. 
149See Schenk, supra note 17, at 161. 
150See Hjorth, supra note 11, at 175. 
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clients.151  Thus, taxing alimony and child support in the same manner would make 
advising divorcing taxpayers much easier for general practice attorneys. 
The final group that would benefit from this simplification of the system is the 
courts.  Under the current system, judicial inquiry is often necessary to sort through 
the complexities of divorce taxation.152  The proposed treatment would eliminate the 
complex rules of Section 71(b), which would consequently make court interpretation 
of these rules obsolete.  No longer would the courts need to delve into complicated 
divorces to determine whether a payment was technically alimony or child support.  
Implementing this proposal would therefore reduce the amount of litigation 
involving the tax implications of divorce.153 
2.  Eliminates Traps for the Unwary 
This proposal also eliminates the traps for the unwary that plague the current 
system.  The exact language to differentiate the payments required by the current 
system is what traps many taxpayers.154  If alimony and child support are taxed the 
same, a taxpayer can no longer inadvertently create one form of payment, while 
attempting to create the other.155  For example, there will no longer be the chance that 
one party will fail to report a payment (thinking it is child support) that the other 
party deducts (thinking it is alimony).156  Both forms of payment will be includable 
and deductible.  Thus, there will be fewer traps for the unwary since it will no longer 
be possible to be caught by complicated code language differentiating between the 
types of payments. 
3.  Eliminates Taxpayer Manipulation 
A further benefit from this sort of taxation is that it will completely eliminate the 
incentive for taxpayer manipulation of payments.  Under the current system, 
taxpayers can disguise one type of payment as the other to receive the desired tax 
treatment.157  With the proposed change, there will be no incentive to disguise one 
type of payment as another since alimony and child support are taxed the same.158  
This will avoid attempts at unfair treatment by one spouse and litigation to determine 
the correct treatment. 
4.  Incentive to Pay 
There is an important non-tax reason to tax the recipient on both forms of 
support.  There is a “deeply disturbing reality of widespread failure of ex-husbands 
                                                                
151See Schenk, supra note 17, at 161. 
152See Kelly, supra note 12, at 803. 
153See Kelly, supra note 12, at 803. 
154See Schenk, supra note 17, at 160-61. 
155See Schenk, supra note 17, at 160-61. 
156See example supra Part III.C.  
157Kelly, supra note 11, at 802-03. 
158Kelly, supra note 11, at 808. 
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to meet their child support obligations.”159  Sixty-five percent of absent fathers do not 
contribute alimony or child support.160  One quarter of individuals who were awarded 
child support received only partial payments and one quarter received no payments 
at all.161  These statistics show that “there is a need for a comprehensive program to 
encourage the payment of child support.”162  The federal income tax system could 
provide such a program.163  By providing a deduction to the payor for both alimony 
and child support, it will serve as an incentive to pay.  Thus, by providing a financial 
incentive, in the form of a tax deduction, it might encourage “deadbeat dads” to pay 
their support obligations. 
There is also an emotional incentive for allowing the payor spouse a deduction 
for child support.  Divorce can be an alienating time for a non-custodial father and 
his children.164  By not allowing the father to deduct child support, it  “reinforce[s] 
the already existing feeling that he is no longer regarded by the state as an important 
part of the child’s life, and that his contributions are meaningless.”165  The current 
system functions to further alienate a non-custodial father from his children.166  The 
allowance of a deduction for child support will allow the non-custodial parent to feel 
as if his contribution is valuable.167  Such a simple change as allowing a tax 
deduction will allow a non-custodial father to support his children without 
discouragement or resentment.168 
5.  Overall Tax Savings 
Further support for the payor-deduction/payee-inclusion model is that the higher 
income earner receives a deduction, while the lower income earner, who is in a lower 
tax bracket, pays the taxes.169  Although it is somewhat counter-intuitive, this allows 
more money to be paid for the support of the ex-spouses’ children.  Since the tax is 
paid by the spouse in the lower tax bracket, the recipient can have more after-tax 
income than if she foregoes inclusion but must accept a much lower gross payment 
in view of the payor’s inability to deduct the payment.  For example,  suppose that 
                                                                
159William A. Klein, Tax Effects of Nonpayment of Child Support, 45 TAX L. REV. 259, 
279 (1990). 
160Jacqueline Pons-Bunney, Non-Custodial Fathers’ Rights: State’s Lack of Incentives for 
the Father to Remain in the Child’s Life, 19 J. JUV. L. 212, 221 (1998). 
161Shaller, supra note 13, at 332. 
162Shaller, supra note 13, at 335. 
163Shaller, supra note 13, at 335. 
164Pons-Bunney, supra note 160, at 228. 
165See Pons-Bunney, supra note 160, at 229. 
166See Pons-Bunney, supra note 160, at 229. 
167See Pons-Bunney, supra note 160, at 229. 
168See Pons-Bunney, supra note 160, at 229. 
169Untying the Knot Tangles Taxes IRS has Many Pitfalls for Divorcing Couples, 
CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Mar. 3, 1997, at 4D. 
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Jack and Jill are in the process of getting a divorce.170  Jack, if single, would be in the 
39.6% marginal rate bracket,171 and Jill would be in the 15% marginal rate bracket.  
They are negotiating child support payments, and Jill would like $500 per month.  If 
the $500 were nondeductible by Jack and excludable by Jill, then Jill’s after-tax 
benefit would be $500.  Jack’s after-tax cost would also be $500.  Thus, $500 would 
be available for child support.  However, if the payments are deductible by Jack and 
includable by Jill, then Jack should be willing to agree to, say, a $600 payment, since 
the after-deduction cost of that payment would be approximately $360 ($500 X 
.40%= $240 deduction).  Jack is much better off under this approach.  However, Jill 
is better off as well.  The after-tax benefit to her of the $600 includable payment is 
$510 (600X.15=90;600-90=510).172  In sum, $510 would be available for child 
support.  Even more money would be generated (and an even higher deduction) if the 
amount of support were increased.173  Therefore, under the proposed payor-deduction 
model, although it seems counter-intuitive, more money can actually be paid as 
support.  
6.  Payment is Income to the Recipient 
Another reason to tax the recipient of alimony and child support is because these 
payments represent income to her.  The Supreme Court defined income as 
"undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have 
complete dominion.”174  Under this definition the recipient has income since support 
payments are accessions to wealth over which she has dominion.175  Furthermore, the 
Internal Revenue Code includes in gross income, “all income from whatever source 
derived,”176 which again makes alimony and child support income to the recipient.  It 
would be unfair to allow the payee to completely escape taxation for such income 
received. 
7.  Assignment- of- Income Doctrine 
Even if alimony and child support payments do not fit within the definition of 
income supplied by the Supreme Court177 or the catch-all language of I.R.C. section 
                                                                
170The numbers from the following hypothetical were taken from a problem in the tax 
textbook, JOSEPH M. DODGE ET AL.,  FEDERAL INCOME TAX: DOCTRINE, STRUCTURE, AND 
POLICY 201 (2d ed. 1999). 
171The 39.6% rate has been rounded to 40% for simplicity. 
172Indeed, Jill should demand even more in child support to take advantage of her ex-
husband’s tax savings. 
173For example, if support is fixed at $800 per month under the proposed system, Jill will 
end up with after-tax cash in hand of $680.  The $800 would be includable in her gross 
income, which produces a tax of $120.  Jack, on the other hand, would get a deduction of $320 
(800 X .40), producing an after-tax cost of $480 (800-320).  In sum, due to their different tax 
brackets, an after-tax cost of $480 to Jack will result in an after-tax benefit of $680 for Jill. 
174Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. 426, 431. 
175For support of this proposition, see discussion supra Part IV.A.7. 
176I.R.C. § 61(a) (2000). 
177See supra note 174, and accompanying text. 
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61,178 they still may be considered income to the recipient.  Under the assignment- 
of- income doctrine, control should indicate who bears the tax burden on a particular 
item of income.179  Although alimony is already taxed to the person who controls it 
(the payee), this is not the case with child support.  By also taxing child support to 
the recipient, the person with control and dominion of the money will correctly be 
taxed. 
Child support and alimony should both be treated as under the control of the 
recipient since there is essentially no economic difference between child support and 
alimony payments.180  Child support, like alimony, is cash paid to the recipient 
without an obligation on the part of the recipient to account for the use of the 
payments.181  Since there is no obligation to account for the use of the payments, the 
recipient is under full control of the funds.  After divorce, the payor does not control 
the recipient.182  In fact, “they are arm’s length economic antagonists.”183  Similarly, 
the payor does not control how the recipient will spend the payments.  
When an ex-husband makes a payment of support, whether alimony or child 
support, to his ex-wife, he has completely relinquished control over such money.184  
The payor of alimony and child support feels less wealthy than before transferring 
the money.185  Furthermore, the transfer is not revocable so money paid is gone 
forever.186  Once the payor has made the payments, he no longer has any dominion or 
control over them and should not be required to pay the corresponding taxes.187 
                                                                
178See supra note 176, and accompanying text. 
179See supra notes 120-36, and accompanying text. 
180See JOSEPH M. DODGE, THE LOGIC OF TAX, FEDERAL INCOME TAX THEORY AND POLICY 
118 (1989). 
181Id. 
182See Asimow, supra note 121, at 108. 
183See Asimow, supra note 121, at 108. 
184This is completely different than the parties in the cases cited supra Part III,D and 
accompanying notes.  In those cases, the taxpayer deliberately attempted to shift income to a 
member of his family.  He would still have substantial control over the income shifted to his 
wife or children.  Thus, the Court found it inequitable for him to escape taxation on such 
income, see supra notes 124, 126.  However, in the context of divorce and alimony payments, 
an ex-husband will have no control over payments made to his ex-wife. 
185See Asimow, supra note 121, at 108; see supra notes 133-35, where the Court declares 
that the husband feels no less wealthy when he allows trust payments to go to his wife (in the 
context of their intact marriage).  Again, this is a different situation than in divorce where a 
husband’s payments of support function to decrease his wealth. 
186See Asimow, supra note 121, at 108. 
187This situation is fundamentally different from the situation described supra note 132 in 
Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. at 118.  In that case, which dealt with interest on a coupon bond, 
the Court said the exercise of the power to dispose of income is the enjoyment and equivalent 
of ownership of it.  In contrast, in divorce, the husband is ordered to make the payments of 
support.  It is not his “enjoyment” or even an “exercise” of power because he is legally 
obligated to make such payments. 
21Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2000
382 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:361 
Even if taxation follows who benefits from the payments rather than who 
controls them, the recipient is also the proper person to tax.188  Assuming taxing 
children is not an option, it is the payee-spouse who uses and benefits from the child 
support.  She has full control of how the payments will be used, and thus she should 
be taxed on them.  One way to view child support is as payments made to a custodial 
parent to help fulfill her obligation of support to her children.189  If it is viewed in this 
way, the recipient should pay taxes since the money is a function of her independent 
budget from which she benefits.190 
By adopting the proposed changes to the system and taxing both alimony and 
child support to the recipient, the person who controls and enjoys the money will 
appropriately be taxed on it.  This treatment is consistent with the assignment-of-
income doctrine, where control dictates the appropriate taxpayer for specific items of 
income.  It is also consistent with the benefit principle, where taxation on income 
should be attributed to the person who benefits from the income. 
8.  Horizontal Equity 
Along the same lines, taxing the recipient on both child support and alimony is 
consistent with the tax policy of horizontal equity.  Under the principle of horizontal 
equity, similarly situated taxpayers should be taxed the same.191  A taxpayer who 
receives payments as excludable child support is better off than a taxpayer with the 
same gross taxable income who does not receive such payments.192  Thus, an ideal 
system would tax the recipient of child support on this increased standard of living. 
For example, imagine there are 2 single mothers who both have total incomes of 
$60,000 per year.  Mother X earned all $60,000 herself and receives no outside child 
support.  Under the present system, she is taxed on all $60,000 of income.  Mother 
Y, on the other hand, earns $35,000 herself and receives the other $25,000 in child 
support from her ex-husband.  Currently, she is only required to pay taxes on the 
$35,000 of wage income.  The remaining $25,000 is hers to use in any manner she 
wishes, tax-free.  Both women have $60,000 to spend on raising their family, but 
Mother X is taxed on the full amount and Mother Y is taxed only on $35,000.  This 
provides a considerable advantage to Mother Y, the recipient of child support.  It 
violates horizontal equity to tax these similarly situated taxpayers differently.  By 
taxing child support to the recipient, these two mothers will be taxed in a like 
manner.  Both women will pay taxes on their full income of $60,000, and horizontal 
equity will be maintained. 
                                                                
188Michael J. McIntyre, Taxation of the Family in a Comprehensive and Simplified Income 
Tax, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1575 (1977). 
189Kelly, supra note 11, at 807. 
190Kelly, supra note 11, at 807.  The author states, “the wife’s obligation to support her 
children is an element of the wife’s independent budget, just as her own rent, food, or clothing 
are budget items.” 
191Dodge, supra note 170, at 22. 
192Shaller, supra note 13, at 329. 
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9.  Counteractive Measures 
Finally, in the interest of fairness, there are tax consequences that somewhat 
counteract the deduction given to the payor.  There are many tax benefits that a 
custodial parent receives for being the caretaker of the children.  First, the Internal 
Revenue Code provides for a tax dependency exemption for the custodial parent.193  
This exemption automatically belongs to the custodial parent unless that parent 
specifically waives this right.194  Also, only the parent who is entitled to claim the 
dependency exemption may receive a $500 per child credit under I.R.C. § 24.195  
Similarly, only the parent who claims the dependency exemption may claim either a 
Hope Scholarship or lifetime learning credit on behalf of the child under I.R.C. 
§ 25A,196 another perk for the custodial spouse. 
Another benefit provided in the tax code for the custodial parent is the 
classification as “head of the household.”197  As the head of the household, the 
mother’s income is taxed at a lower rate than the non-custodial father, who is now 
classified as “single.”198  Therefore, under the proposed change, even though the 
recipient of child support would be taxed on the payments, she is able to be taxed at 
a lower rate on this income than the payor by taking advantage of ‘head of the 
household’ status. 
One final benefit the custodial parent receives is a tax credit for child care.199  
Custodial parents are permitted to credit a percentage of the amount spent each year 
on child care against their tax debt.200  This means such credit may cancel part of the 
                                                                
193I.R.C. § 152(e)(1)(A) (2000).  This provision applies regardless of the amount of 
support actually provided by either of the parents.  Thus, even if the non-custodial parent 
provides nearly all of the financial support, the custodial parent may still claim the child as a 
dependant.  See McMahon, supra note 5, at 236-37. 
194I.R.C. § 152(e)(2)(A).  The statute reads: “A child of parents described in paragraph (1) 
shall be treated as having received over half of his support during a calendar year from the 
noncustodial parent if–(A) the custodial parent signs a written declaration . . . that such 
custodial parent will not claim such child as a dependent for any taxable year beginning in 
such calendar year, and (B) the noncustodial parent attaches such written declaration to the 
noncustodial parent’s return for the taxable year beginning during such calendar year.” 
195See McMahon, supra note 5, at 237-38 (discussing I.R.C. § 24).  This article points out 
that the § 24 child credit is refundable against FICA taxes as well as income taxes if it exceeds 
the taxpayer’s income tax liability and the taxpayer has three or more qualifying children.   
196See McMahon, supra note 5, at 238.  This is especially significant because the parent 
receives the credit even if the tuition is paid with the child’s own funds or even out of child 
support. 
197See Braver, supra note 20, at 123. 
198See Braver, supra note 20, at 123.  The mother can be declared head of the household 
even if she is not the primary provider for the children’s material needs.  This means that even 
if the father is the primary financial supporter of his children, the mother is the one who 
benefits from this status. 
199See Braver, supra note 20, at 123. 
200See I.R.C. § 32 (2000). 
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mother’s tax debt.201  Fathers, on the other hand, may not receive a tax credit for 
child care.202  Again, this presents a tax advantage for the recipient of child support 
as the custodial parent. 
Therefore, there are many provisions built into the system that allow tax breaks 
for custodial parents.  Under the current system, not only does the custodial parent 
have the above-mentioned benefits, but she also receives the child support payments 
tax-free.  Thus, viewed in light of these benefits to the custodial parent, the proposed 
system in which child support and alimony are taxed to the recipient is equitable. 
Another tax consequence is the federal tax refund offset for nonpayment of child 
support.203  This is a program that combines the effort of the Internal Revenue 
Service, Federal Office of Child Support Enforcement, and State Child Support 
Enforcement Agencies.204  The program identifies individuals who are past due on 
their child support payments and takes this amount out of their tax refund, if any, 
due.205  This serves as a penalty for nonpayment of child support while also 
attempting to get the money (in the form of intercepting the payor’s tax refund) and 
placing it in the hands of the recipient. 
Therefore, under the current system there are tax penalties for not paying child 
support, yet there are no tax benefits to paying child support.  However, as has been 
demonstrated, there are several tax benefits for the recipient of child support.206  
Therefore, these consequences should be balanced with a tax benefit (in the form of a 
deduction) to the ex-husband if he does pay child support. 
                                                                
201Braver, supra note 20, at 123. 
202See Braver, supra note 20, at 123.  A non-custodial parent may not receive a tax credit 
for child care, even on money spent by the parent to care for the child during periods of 
temporary visitation, such as summer visitation. 
203See Federal Tax Refund Offset (visited Jan. 6, 2000) <http://www.acf. 
dhhs.gov/programs/cse/fct/cstrop.htm>. 
204Id. 
205Id.  Since 1982, almost ten million tax refunds have been intercepted by this program.  
Over six billion dollars have been collected.  The process entails a cooperative effort between 
the IRS, OCSE and State CSE agencies.  State CSE agencies submit names, social security 
numbers, and the amount in default of people who are past due on child support payments to 
the IRS.  The IRS then flags the tax returns of those individuals.  If a refund is due, the proper 
amount is collected to offset past due child support payments.  The money taken out of the 
refund check is sent to the OCSE and then to the state which submitted the case.  From that 
point, it depends whether the case is an Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) 
case.  If so, the state keeps the money to help make AFDC payments.  In non-AFDC cases, the 
state gives the money directly to the parent and child.  If the case is both AFDC and non-
AFDC, the AFDC arrearages are paid first.   
In order for a case to be eligible for a tax refund offset, there must be a delinquent child 
support order.  However, if the child support order includes an award for alimony, the tax 
refund may also cover past due spousal support.  The parent who owes support must be at least 
three months behind in child support payments.  In AFDC cases, the amount owed must be at 
least $150, and in non-AFDC cases, the amount must be at least $500. 
206See discussion in Part IV.A.9. 
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B.  Arguments Against Proposal 
Although there are many reasons in support of this proposal, there are also some 
arguments that could be made against it.  One outspoken argument that has been 
made is that taxing the recipient “intensif[ies] the economic hardship generally 
suffered by women after divorce or separation.”207  Another argument is that treating 
the payments the same for tax purposes eliminates a negotiation tool for divorcing 
spouses.208  Finally, it has been argued that such treatment creates inequities between 
divorced and non-divorced couples.209  However, it will be demonstrated that all of 
these arguments are invalid and do not provide enough support to discredit the 
proposed method of taxing both alimony and child support to the payee spouse. 
1.  Intensifies Economic Hardship to Women Following Divorce 
One major argument against taxing both child support and alimony to the 
recipient is that it further economically disadvantages the ex-wife after divorce.210  
However, there is recent research to suggest that the economic hardship suffered by 
women has been greatly exaggerated.211  Even if there is such a hardship, the payor-
deduction/payee-inclusion method of taxation does not contribute to the hardship.  
Indeed, as demonstrated earlier,212 allowing a deduction to the higher earning spouse 
for child support can increase the amount that the payor is willing to pay, compared 
to a no-deduction world. 
The hardship suffered by women is not as great as it was once believed.213  It was 
previously believed that following divorce, mothers’ and children’s standard of 
living sharply declined while fathers’ standard of living on average increased.214  The 
most publicized advocate of this research was Lenore Weitzman, who conducted a 
study in the 1980’s on the economic status of women and men following divorce.215  
Weitzman concluded that, following divorce, the average divorced woman’s 
standard of living dropped by 73%, while the average divorced male’s standard of 
living increased by 42%.216  These figures were cited in legislative debates, 
newspapers, magazines, law review articles, social science articles, appeals cases and 
                                                                
207Moran, supra note 24, at 117. 
208Schenk, supra note 17, at 165. 
209Coe, supra note 22, at 983. 
210Moran, supra note 24, at 117. 
211Braver, supra note 20, at 115-16. 
212See supra notes 170-73 and accompanying text. 
213Braver, supra note 20, at 116. 
214Braver, supra note 20, at 113. 
215LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND 
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF DIVORCE FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA 323-56 
(1985). 
216Id. 
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even some U.S. Supreme Court cases.217  However, current research has proven that 
these numbers are highly exaggerated.218  In reality, the difference between the 
economic status of men and women after divorce is negligible.219  In fact, in some 
states fathers may now be more impoverished by divorce than mothers.220 
Furthermore, even if there is an economic disadvantage for women after divorce, 
it is not ameliorated by the tax system.  As the Jack and Jill example from above 
demonstrates,221 allowing the payor spouse to deduct alimony and child support 
payments actually allows the recipient to receive more money after taxes.  By taxing 
the person in the lower tax bracket, the overall tax liability is less.  This means that, 
as a whole, more after-tax money will be available as support. 
2.  Eliminates Negotiation Tools 
Another possible criticism of the proposed tax system is that if alimony and child 
support are treated the same, there will be no room for divorcing spouses to 
negotiate.222  Although ideally they should not, taxes often play a major role in 
divorce negotiation.223  If alimony and child support are taxed the same, some of this 
negotiation will be eliminated.  For example, under the current system, an ex-
husband may be willing to pay more money in the form of child support (which is 
not includable/nondeductible) in exchange for his ex-wife meeting one of his 
demands.  Similarly, the ex-wife may allow more payments to be classified as 
alimony if one of her demands is met.   
Although the proposed system would eliminate this realm of negotiation, there 
are several other areas left for ex-spouses to negotiate.  One previously mentioned 
option is the tax dependency exemption.224  Since the custodial parent may opt to 
                                                                
217Braver, supra note 20, at 113.  This author states, “It would probably be fair to say that 
Weitzman’s findings are the most widely known and influential social science results of the 
last twenty years.” 
218Braver, supra note 20, at 113.  Although Weitzman’s figures were the most highly 
publicized of research on the economic impact of divorce, they substantially departed from 
other researchers’ findings.  Therefore, efforts were made to reproduce her findings using her 
exact sample.  In 1996, Peterson re-analyzed Weitzman’s computer and paper records, and he 
yielded drastically different results.  He found her sample to yield only a 27 percent drop in 
standard of living for women following divorce and a 10 percent rise in men’s standard of 
living.  Later, Weitzman acknowledged that her original calculations were wrong due to an 
error made by a research assistant.  Braver, supra note 20, at 115-16. 
219Braver, supra note 20, at 134.  Braver re-examined the economic impact that divorce 
has on fathers versus mothers.  He revisited research previously performed by himself and 
others on the topic.  This time, he factored in the payment of taxes and sharing expenses of 
children between the two households.  After making these adjustments, he concluded that the 
gender gap after divorce was “vanishingly small.”  See id. 
220See Braver, supra note 20, at 134. 
221See supra Part V for an explanation of how providing a deduction to the payor spouse 
can generate more after-tax income to the payee spouse. 
222See Schenk, supra note 17, at 165. 
223See Schenk, supra note 17, at 165. 
224See infra notes 193-94 and accompanying text (discussing I.R.C. § 152(e)). 
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waive this right, the exemption could remain a tax negotiating tool for divorcing 
spouses.225  A custodial parent could offer the dependency exemption to the non-
custodial parent in exchange for more support.  Furthermore, there are many other 
areas of negotiation, not within the scope of this paper, such as property settlements 
that still leave options for divorcing couples. 
3.  Creates Inequities Between Divorced and Non-Divorced Couples 
A final argument against this proposal is that it creates an inequity between 
divorced and intact families.226  The argument goes as follows: Parents in an intact 
family are not allowed to deduct payments made to support their children, so why 
should parents in divorced families get such a deduction?227  From this viewpoint, it 
appears that divorced couples get a tax break that is not available for married 
couples.228  However, this argument is flawed.229  A married couple is taxed only 
once on income used to support their children.230  This is also the case in a divorce 
situation.231  Under the proposed system, the economic unit is still taxed only once, in 
the form of the recipient including the child support payment in gross income.232  
Thus, divorced parents are not given an advantage over married parents.  Despite 
these possible arguments opposing it, the proposed method of taxing only the 
recipient on alimony and child support is the best way to reform the tax system as it 
pertains to divorce. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The current system of taxing alimony to the recipient and child support to the 
payee cannot stand.  It has been demonstrated that this system is unnecessarily 
complex and causes confusion among average taxpayers, excess litigation, and traps 
for the unwary.233  The present system is also inconsistent with the values of the 
assignment-of-income doctrine which advocate taxing the person who controls and 
enjoys the money.  Furthermore, the current system is no longer justified by the 
economic disparity between spouses following divorce.234  
                                                                
225Taggart, supra note 68, at 358. 
226See Coe, supra note 22, at 983.  This paper analyzes the taxation of alimony and child 
support in Canada.  Canada recently switched from allowing a deduction for child support 
payments to disallowing such a deduction.  However, alimony remains taxable to the payee.  
Now, Canada and the United States have the same system of taxation for alimony and child 
support.  The author suggests that these changes will do more harm to Canada’s system of 
taxation than good.  Id. at 994. 
227See Coe, supra note 22, at 983. 
228See Coe, supra note 22, at 983. 
229See Schenk, supra note 17, at 164. 
230See Schenk, supra note 17, at 164. 
231See Schenk, supra note 17, at 164. 
232See Schenk, supra note 17, at 164. 
233See Moran, supra note 24, at 117-18. 
234See Braver, supra note 20, at 117. 
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Congress and the Supreme Court have struggled over the past century to 
determine the proper tax treatment of alimony and child support.  There have been 
several different systems in effect, starting with the no-deduction/exclusion model of 
Gould.235  The Tax Code of 1954 changed this system and codified a method of 
deduction/inclusion for alimony but retained the Gould no-deduction/exclusion for 
child support.236  Through many amendments and finally a major overhaul in 1984, 
changes were made.  However, the basic structure of taxing alimony and child 
support differently was retained.237  Unfortunately, none of this reform has produced 
a system that is workable in the present divorce context.  The system must be 
reformed in order to make the tax consequences of divorce more straightforward and 
consistent with tax policy. 
By treating alimony and child support the same for tax purposes, it will eliminate 
the confusion and traps for the unwary that the current system causes.238  Since there 
will not be a difference in the way such payments are taxed under the proposed 
system, there will be no incentive for taxpayer manipulation.239  Furthermore, it will 
serve as both a financial and emotional incentive240 for individuals to meet their 
obligations of alimony or child support, and it will tax the person who actually 
controls and enjoys the money, which is consistent with the assignment-of-income 
doctrine.  Taxing the recipient will maintain horizontal equity and generate more 
after-tax money to be used as support than the present system.  Finally, taxing 
alimony and child support to the recipient is not a windfall for the payor.  There are 
penalties for an ex-husband who does not meet his support obligations.241  There are 
also several tax benefits for the recipient of child support that somewhat equalize the 
deduction/inclusion treatment. 
Divorce is a devastating event both emotionally and financially.  The tax laws 
should not make divorce even more difficult.  The tax consequences of divorce 
should be simple, straightforward and fair.  The taxpayers, attorneys and judges 
involved in divorce should be able to understand and apply the provisions.242  
Therefore, the present system must be changed.  Alimony and child support should 
be treated the same for tax purposes.  Both forms of payment should be taxed to the 
recipient in the form of an inclusion in her gross income and a corresponding 
deduction for the payor. 
LAURA BIGLER 
                                                                
235Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151. 
236I.R.C. § 71(a)(b) (1954) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 71(b)(c)). 
237I.R.C. §§ 71, 215 (2000). 
238See Schenk, supra note 17, at 160-61. 
239See Kelly, supra note 11, at 802-03. 
240See Pons-Bunney, supra note 160, at 228. 
241See Federal Tax Refund Offset, supra notes 203-05. 
242See Hjorth, supra note 11, at 190. 
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